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Abstract—This paper considers a novel formulation of inverse
reinforcement learning (IRL) with behavioral economics con-
straints to address inverse sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)
and inverse search in Bayesian agents. We first estimate the
stopping and search costs by observing the actions of these
agents using Bayesian revealed preference from microeconomics
and rational inattention from behavioral economics. We also
solve the inverse problem of the more general rationally inat-
tentive SHT where the agent incorporates controlled sensing
by optimally choosing from various sensing modes. Second,
we design statistical hypothesis tests with bounded Type-I and
Type-II error probabilities to detect if the agents are Bayesian
utility maximizers when their actions are measured in noise. By
dynamically tuning the prior specified to the agents, we formulate
an active IRL framework which enhances these detection tests
and minimizes their Type-II and Type-I error probabilities of
utility maximization detection. Finally, we give a finite sample
complexity result which provides finite sample bounds on the
error probabilities of the detection tests.
Index Terms—Inverse Reinforcement Learning, Bayesian Re-
vealed Preferences, Behavioral Economics, Inverse detection,
Sequential Hypothesis testing, Bayesian Search, Statistical Hy-
pothesis Testing, Noisy Revealed Preferences, Stochastic Approx-
imation, Finite Sample Complexity
I. INTRODUCTION
Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to estimate the
utility function of agents by observing its response. This
paper considers IRL for Bayesian sequential hypothesis testing
(SHT) and Bayesian search. Both Bayesian SHT and optimal
search are examples of Bayesian optimal stopping problems.
By observing the decisions of a Bayesian agent performing
SHT/search, how to reconstruct its stopping/search costs?
Figure 1 displays the schematic setup. There are two parts
to the model in Fig. 1: a rationally inattentive Bayesian agent
maximizing its expected utility and an inverse learner recording
the agent’s actions. The IRL1 problem faced by the inverse
learner is as follows: by observing the decisions of the agents,
how to detect if the agents are utility maximizers? If so, how
to estimate their utility functions? This paper uses Bayesian
revealed preference [3], [4] and Rational inattention [5],
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1IRL [1], [2] assumes the observed agents are utility maximizers and then
seeks to estimate their utility functions. The revealed preference framework
considered here is more general since it identifies if the behavior is consistent
with a utility function and then estimates a set of utility functions that rationalize
the dataset.
[6] to achieve IRL. Stemming from behavioral economics,
rational inattention means that the agent incurs an information
acquisition cost for obtaining observations of the underlying
state (typically in terms of an information theoretic measure
such as mutual information). Bayesian revealed preference
yields necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying a
Bayesian utility maximizer with costly information acquisition
and constructs set valued estimates of the utility function that
rationalizes the data. The rational inattention based Bayesian
utility maximization model and the key results in Bayesian
revealed preference are discussed in detail in Sec. II.
Fig. 1. Schematic of the IRL framework considered in this paper for testing
rational inattention based utility maximization in Bayesian agents. The agents
generate actions aik when the state is x
i
k . The inverse learner records the
state-action pairs generated from the agents over several independent runs and
tests if the actions are generated from rationally inattentive agents. If so, it
then estimates their utility functions.
A. Context
Non-parametric estimation of utility functions given a finite
length time series of decisions and budget constraints is
the central theme in the area of revealed preferences in
microeconomics, starting with [7], [8] where remarkable
necessary and sufficient conditions for utility maximization
are given; see also [9], [10], [11] and more recently in
machine learning [12]. While classical revealed preference [7],
[9], [11] considers decision making in a non-Bayesian en-
vironment, recent work like [3], [4], [13], [14] focus on
utility estimation in a Bayesian setting where an agent seeks
to maximize its expected utility while incurring a cost for
information acquisition. Unlike classical revealed preference,
the utility function in our Bayesian set-up in Fig. 1 involves
discrete valued variables. While classical revealed preference
is motivated by unobservability of preferences of the decision
maker [8], Bayesian revealed preference theory is motivated
by unobservability of the information acquired by the decision
maker.
The concept of costly information acquisition is studied in
behavioral economics as Rational Inattention [5], [6], [14]–
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2the key idea is that human attention spans for information
acquisition are limited and can be modeled in information
theoretic terms as a Shannon capacity limited communication
channel. For our purposes, rational inattention can be viewed
as controlled sensing; the decision making agent adapts its
sensing mode referred to as attention function in behavioral
economics literature [4] to minimize a cumulative information
acquisition cost (typically mutual information).
Sequential hypothesis testing [15] has been widely used in
literature for diverse applications like underwater acoustics [16],
image processing [17], [18], cognitive radars [19] and bio-
medical applications such as detecting ventricular fibrilla-
tion [20]. Bayesian search [15] has been use in applications
involving astronomy [21], bioinformatics [22] and vehicular
tracking [23]. The inverse problem of estimating the stopping
costs for SHT has not been addressed to the best of our
knowledge. [24] is most closely related to our inverse search
problem and provides a real-time procedure for assisting a
human performing a bandit task to maximize its expected
cumulative reward. Our approach differs greatly from [24]
where we record the agent’s decision sequence without external
interference with the primary goal of reconstructing the agent’s
costs.
B. Applications
Estimating the utility function of a rationally inattentive
Bayesian agent has several important classes of applications.
The first class of applications includes adversarial inference
problems: by observing the decisions of an enemy, can we say
that the enemy is a Bayesian utility maximizer? Also, how to
determine the cost parameters of a detector employed by an
enemy? This allows us to predict future decisions of the enemy.
[25] uses spectral revealed preferences to detect cognition in
radars through intelligent probing.
The second class of applications lies in understanding human
decision makers in multimedia social networks like YouTube.
We want to model the behavior of the human user interacting
with a YouTube video webpage. In [26] we show that YouTube
user groups are rationally inattentive in their commenting
behavior. We also demonstrate that the estimated utility function
can accurately predict user commenting behavior. In the
YouTube case, the rationally inattentive user faces a static
optimization problem whereas the problems in this paper are
more general– they are dynamic stopping time problems.
The third class of examples involve human robot interface
systems. By observing a human decision maker, how can a
robot learn the utility function of the human decision maker
so as to mimic the human decision maker (apprenticeship
learning)? [27] estimates the utility function by observing a
human expert whose utility is assumed to be linearly separable
in known features. [28] builds on the work of [27] to enable
a robot to learn complex helicopter maneuvers from a human
expert and design apprenticeship learning based controllers for
autonomous helicopters.
C. Objectives
In this paper, our working assumption is that the agents
are rationally inattentive utility maximizers, i.e. , they aim
to maximize their expected utility while optimally acquiring
costly information. The main objectives of this paper involve
answering:
1. Test for Rationality and Estimation of Stop-
ping/Search costs for SHT and Search: The first question
is: by observing the decisions of Bayesian agents, how to test
if the agents are rationally inattentive? If so, how to determine
their stopping/search costs? Sec. III and Sec. IV extend the
static rationally inattentive utility maximization problem to
dynamic optimization problems of sequential hypothesis testing
and Bayesian search respectively. Corollary 1 and Corollary 2
propose a convex and linear feasibility test respectively for
SHT and search which take in as input decision sequences of
the Bayesian agents and generate set-valued estimates of the
stopping and search costs, respectively.
2. Inverse RL for Rationally Inattentive SHT: In
Sec. V, we generalize the SHT framework from Sec. III to
rationally inattentive SHT where the hypothesis detector has
access to sensing modes of varying accuracy and incurs a
rational inattention cost for their use. We show that inverse
generalized SHT is also an instance of the rationally inattentive
utility maximization problem (2), (3) and can be solved by
Corollary 1.
3. Detecting Rationally Inattentive Utility Maximization
in noise: The next question we address is: If the agents’ actions
are measured in noise, how to detect if the agents are rationally
inattentive utility maximizers? Authors in [29] propose a
statistical hypothesis test for detecting utility maximization
behavior when the agents’ responses are corrupted by additive
noise for a non-Bayesian setting [7]. Using a similar approach,
we propose two statistical hypothesis tests in Sec. VII to detect
if the observed Bayesian agents are rationally inattentive when
their actions are measured in noise. The first test upper bounds
the Type-I error probability and the second upper bounds the
Type-II error probability of detecting rationally inattentive
behavior. Given the detectors in Sec. VII, what choice of
the agents’ prior minimizes their Type-II and Type-I error
probabilities? An active IRL scheme for Bayesian agents is
described in Sec. VII-B which adaptively tunes the prior using
a stochastic gradient algorithm to achieve the optimal prior.
4. Finite sample performance of the Statistical Tests in
Objective 3: Finally, how to assess the performance of the
statistical tests given a finite observation dataset? In Sec. VII,
we provide probabilistic bounds on the Type-I and Type-II error
probabilities of the statistical hypothesis detectors in Sec. VII
in terms of the sample size of the observed decision sequences.
II. BAYESIAN REVEALED PREFERENCE AND RATIONAL
INATTENTION
The IRL problem considered in this paper and shown
schematically in Fig. 1 comprises two parts: a rationally
inattentive agent maximizing its expected utility while incurring
an information acquisition cost and an inverse learner recording
the agent’s actions. This section explains the rational inattention
based Bayesian utility maximization model which is a central
theme of this paper. It also states the key results in Bayesian
revealed preference for testing if the observed decisions
3of Bayesian agents are consistent with utility maximization
behavior.
A. Rationally inattentive utility maximization (Agent centric
view)
We first describe the behavior of the Bayesian agent whose
utility function the inverse learner aims to estimate. Given prior
µ over a set of states X and observation likelihood α(·|x) that
determines the accuracy of the agent’s measurement given state
x ∈ X , the agent records observation y ∈ Y (a noisy version
of state x) and performs the following steps.
Step 1. Computes the posterior distribution (belief) p(x|y)
as
p(x|y) = µ(x)α(y|x)∑
z∈X
µ(z)α(y|z) . (1)
Step 2. Chooses action a∗ and observation likelihood α∗
optimally according to (2) and (3) in Definition 1 for Bayesian
utility maximization below.
Definition 1 (Classical Bayesian Utility Maximization [4]).
An agent is a rationally inattentive Bayesian utility maximizer
if there exists a non-negative information acquisition cost
C(α) such that given a utility function u(·), the agent chooses
observation likelihood α∗(y|x) and action a∗ ∈ A which satisfy
the following two conditions
(i) Expected Utility Maximization:
a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
{
Ep(·|y){u(x, a)|y}
}
= argmax
a∈A
{∑
x∈X
p(x|y)u(x, a)
}
. (2)
(ii) Optimal Likelihood selection:
α∗ ∈ argmax
α∈α
Eα,µ
{
max
a∈A
Ep(·|y){u(x, a)}
}
− C(α), (3)
where C(α) is the information acquisition cost of observation
likelihood α.
B. Bayesian Revealed Preference (Inverse learner centric view)
We now describe the inverse RL problem faced by the inverse
learner after observing the decision of the agents. Suppose
the inverse learner observes i = 1, 2, . . .M Bayesian agents
for k = 1, 2, . . .K independent iterations. At the kth iteration,
agent i takes an action aik ∈ A given state xik ∈ X . The inverse
learner aggregates the recorded state-action pairs (xik, a
i
k) into
the dataset D defined as
D = {(xik, aik), k ∈ {1, . . .K}, i ∈ {1, . . .M}} (4)
Given dataset D, the aim of the inverse learner is to determine
if the Bayesian agents are rationally inattentive? That is, do
there exist observation likelihoods αi which generates the
observations for agent i = 1, 2 . . . ,M and utility functions
{ui(x, a), i = 1, . . .M} the agents maximize according to (6)
to generate their actions. How can the inverse learner estimate
such utility functions that rationalize the agents’ behavior?
To explain the main IRL ideas of this paper, we first
briefly summarize a key result from [4] regarding Bayesian
revealed preferences. [4] specifies two necessary and sufficient
conditions, namely, NIAS (No Improving Action Switches) and
NIAC (No Improving Action Cycles) for the Bayesian agents
generating D to be rationally inattentive. These conditions
involve the action selection policies {pi(a|x), i ∈ {1, 2 . . .M}}
of the agents that can be evaluated by the inverse learner from
D for sufficiently large K as follows
pi(a|x) =
∑K
k=1 1{xik = x, aik = a}∑K
k=1 1{xik = x}
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . .M}. (5)
We can now state the following known result.
Proposition 1 ([26]). The dataset D (4) is consistent with
rational inattentive utility maximization (2), (3) in Definition 1
if and only if the action selection policy pk(a|x), utility function
uk(x, a) and prior µ for agent k ∈ {1, 2 . . .M} satisfy the
following two inequalities:
(1) NIAS({pk(a|x)}, {uk(x, a)}, µ) ≤ 0 (6)
(2) NIAC({pk(a|x)}, {uk(x, a)}, µ) ≤ 0 (7)
Proposition 1 provides a method for the inverse learner to
generate set valued estimates of the utility uk(x, a) without
knowledge of the observation likelihood αk or observations
yk (k indexes the agent). For the time being, the NIAS and
NIAC inequalities in Proposition 1 can be interpreted as
operators convex in the agent’s utility function and will be
defined in Sec. III. When the action selection policy and prior
in Proposition 1 are known, the inverse learner can estimate
the utility functions by solving a convex feasibility problem
with the constraints specified by NIAS and NIAC.
The result in Proposition 1 forms the basis of the IRL
framework devised in this paper which involves formulating
dynamic multistage problems of sequential hypothesis testing
and Bayesian search as the one stage problem in Definition 1 in
later sections. We also focus on utility estimation of Bayesian
agents in non-ideal settings like measurement noise, finite
dataset size etc. The results in the subsequent sections enrich
existing work like [30] in the area of inverse RL in partially
observed settings where the agent has incomplete information
about the underlying state. It is imperative to note that our
contribution does not fall under the domain of Bayesian
IRL [31] where the reward functions are assumed to be
stochastic while the agent measures the state with complete
accuracy.
III. INVERSE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR
SEQUENTIAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we first show that optimal SHT is a special
instance of the rational inattention based utility maximization
model in Definition 1. Then, we propose a convex feasibility
test based on the optimality conditions in Proposition 1 to
estimate the agent’s incurred stopping costs, thereby achieving
IRL for SHT.
4A. Sequential Hypothesis Testing (SHT) Problem
The sequential hypothesis testing problem is a tuple
(X ,Y,A, C) where
• X = {f1, f2} is the set of states (distributions) which
determines the distribution agent’s observation likelihood.
At time 0, the state x is sampled from pi0.
• Z ⊂ R is the set of observations sequentially measured
by the agent at time instants k = 1, 2, . . . .
• A = X ∪ {continue} is the set of actions available to the
agent at any time k = 1, 2, . . . .
• C : X × A → R+, C(x, a) is the cost incurred by the
agent for taking action a ∈ A when the state is x ∈ X .
C(x, a) =

c if a = continue,
0 if x = a,
Li if x = fi 6= a.
The agent makes a decision based on available information
Ik = {z0, z1, . . . zk} at time k to minimize its incurred
cumulative expected cost. The belief pik computed via the
Bayesian filter (8) below is a sufficient statistic for Ik [32]
defined as
pik(i) = P(x = i|Fk), i ∈ X ,
where Fk is the sigma algebra generated by Ik. The belief pik
is evaluated recursively as follows
pik =
B(zk)pik−1
1′B(zk)pik−1
, B(z) = diag({p(z|fi)}). (8)
The belief pik is a |X |-dimensional probability vector. It lives
in the belief space ∆(X ), the |X |−1 dimensional unit simplex
of pmfs defined as
∆(X ) def.= {pi ∈ R|X | : 1′pi = 1, pi(i) ≥ 0, ∀i} (9)
The agent chooses the stationary policy µ∗ : ∆(X ) →
A∪ {continue} to determine its actions at time k given belief
pik to minimize its expected cumulative cost
µ∗ = argmin
µ
Eµ
{
τ(µ) c+ min
a∈X
pi′τ(µ)[C(f1, a) C(f2, a)]
′
}
.
(10)
In (10), τ(µ) is an Fk-measurable stopping time induced by
the policy µ and c is the continue cost. The value function
V : ∆(X ) → R+ for the SHT problem is defined as the
minimum expected cost incurred by the agent whose prior
is pi and satisfies Bellman’s equation for a partially ordered
Bayesian system [32].
V (pi) = min
{
pi′Cf1 , pi
′Cf2 ,
c+ Ez
{
V
(
B(z)pi
1′B(z)pi
)}}
. (11)
The optimization problem in (10) can be solved via the follow-
ing known result using stochastic dynamic programming [33].
Proposition 2 ([33], Sec. 3.4). There exist numbers α, β ∈
(0, 1) such that the optimal policy µ for sequential hypothesis
testing when the belief is pi is given by the following threshold
rule.
µ(pi) =

stop, choose f2, if 0 ≤ pi(1) ≤ β
continue, if β < pi(1) ≤ α
stop, choose f1, if α < pi(1) ≤ 1.
(12)
The threshold values α and β indicate the minimum and
maximum value of pi(1) such that it is optimal to stop and
choose f1 and f2 respectively, i.e. ,
α = min p s.t. [p (1− p)]′Cf2 ≥ V ([p (1− p)]),
β = max p s.t. [p (1− p)]′Cf1 ≥ V ([p (1− p)]),
where V (·) denotes the value function for the SHT problem
defined in (11).
B. Optimal SHT as Bayesian Utility Maximization
Our first result below is Theorem 1. It specifies a proce-
dure for converting the multi-horizon sequential optimization
problem in (10) to the static Bayesian optimization problem
in (3). The key idea is to express the expected sequentially
accumulated cost of the agent till it stops in terms of the pdf
of the agent’s stopping belief.
Given policy µ, prior pi0 and observation space Y = ∆(X ),
define
αµ(ypi|x) =Pµ{piτ(µ) = pi|x}, ∀ypi ∈ Y, (13)
R(αµ) =c Eµ{τ(µ)}, (14)
where τ(µ) is the Fk-measurable stopping time induced by
policy µ. In (13), αµ is an observation likelihood equal to the
pdf of the agent’s stopping belief for a fixed state and policy
µ. Further discussion on the construction of αµ is provided
in Appendix C. The term R(αµ) in (14) will be interpreted
in Theorem 1 below as the information cost for choosing
observation likelihood αµ.
Theorem 1. Given an agent with known prior pi0 using
optimal policy µ∗ for sequential hypothesis testing. The
observation likelihood αµ∗ defined in (13) is the solution
to the static Bayesian optimization problem (3) where the
information acquisition cost for choosing likelihood α is given
by R(α) (14).
αµ∗ ∈ argmax
µ
Eαµ,pi0{maxA
∑
X
p(x|y)u(x, a)} −R(αµ).
The utility function u(x, a) maximized by the agent is the
negative of the cost C(x, a) (10) incurred for taking action a
in state x.
Theorem 1 is a special case of the more general framework
in Theorem 5 for rationally inattentive SHT described in Sec. V
where there is an added rational inattention cost incurred by
the agent based on the chosen sensing accuracy. The key idea
behind Theorem 1 is that the expected stop cost and cumulative
rational inattention cost for a policy µ can be expressed only
in terms of the prior pi0 and the measure αµ defined in (13).
5C. IRL Estimation of Stopping Costs
In the previous subsection, we showed that optimal sequential
hypothesis testing is equivalent to the one-shot Bayesian utility
maximization problem (1). We now propose a convex feasibility
test to generate set-valued estimates of the Bayesian agent’s
stopping costs C(x, a), x, a ∈ X . According to Theorem 1 in
the previous subsection, the estimated utility function of the
equivalent one-shot optimization problem for SHT is equal to
the negative of the hypothesis detecting agent’s stopping costs.
The inverse learner obtains dataset D (4) from M hypothesis
detecting agents by recording the underlying state and the
corresponding stopping action over K independent iterations
for all M agents and evaluates the action selection policies
{pi(a|x), i ∈ {1, . . .M}} using (5). Recall from Proposition 1
that the NIAS and NIAC operators are convex in the utility
functions of the agents. Since the action selection policies
and prior are known, the agents’ utility functions can be
estimated by solving a convex feasibility problem as described
below in Corollary 1 with the NIAS and NIAC inequalities
are constraints.
Corollary 1. The NIAS and NIAC conditions in Proposition 1
can be expressed as the following convex feasibility problem:
Find uk(x, a) > 0 ∀a, b ∈ A, k ∈ {1, 2 . . .M} such that the
following two inequalities hold
NIAS :
∑
x∈X
pk(x|a)[uk(x, a)− uk(x, b)] ≥ 0
NIAC :
kL∑
k=k1
∑
a∈A
pk(a)
∑
x
pk(x|a)uk(x, a)−mk(a) ≥ 0,
∀k1:L ∈ {1, . . .K} (L ≤M), kL+1 = k1 where
mk(a) = max
b∈A
∑
x∈X
pk(x|a)uk+1(x, b). (15)
Since the observer is unaware of the agents’ true utility
functions uk(·), Corollary 1 can be interpreted as a feasibility
test to estimate uk(·) that rationalize the data according to
Definition 1. Methods to solve the convex feasibility problem of
Corollary 1 include the projection algorithm [34], interior points
algorithm [35] etc. The pdf p(x|y) in (1) can be interpreted as
the private belief evaluated by the agent after measuring y in
the sense of social learning [32]. Since p(x|y) is unavailable to
us, we utilize the public belief as a result of the agent’s action,
namely, p(x|a) to estimate the agent’s utility. From Theorem 1,
the inverse learner knows how the estimated utility functions
relate to the stopping costs of the agents which can be easily
evaluated once the convex feasibility problem in Corollary 1
is solved. Hence, Corollary 1 with the added constraint that
u(x, x) = 0, x ∈ X solves the inverse sequential hypothesis
testing problem of estimating the incurred costs of hypothesis
detecting agents.
IV. INVERSE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR BAYESIAN
SEARCH
This section considers IRL for Bayesian search of a non-
moving target. We reformulate the agent’s optimal search policy
as the solution to a generalized static Bayesian optimization
problem (18) which includes the utility maximization model
of (2) in Definition 1 as a special case. Finally, we propose
a linear feasibility test to estimate the search costs of the
Bayesian searchers.
A. Bayesian Sequential Search problem
The Bayesian search model is a tuple (X ,Y,A, C) where
• X = {1, 2, . . . N} is the set of states which determines
the fixed location of the non-moving target. At time 0,
the state x is sampled from pi0.
• A = X is the set of actions (boxes to search) available
to the agent at any time k = 1, 2, . . . .
• Y = {found, not found} is the set of observations mea-
sured by the agent at times k = 1, 2, . . . after searching
box ak ∈ A.
P(yk = found) =
{
αi, if x, ak = i
0, otherwise.
The search process stops when the observation yk = found.
The term αi is known as the reveal probability of box i.
• C = {ca, a ∈ A}, ca is the cost incurred by the agent
for searching box a.
Let Ik = {a0, y0, a1, y1, . . . ak, yk} denote the information
available to the agent at time k and Fk = σ(Ik) be the sigma-
algebra generated by Ik. Denote the agent’s belief over the
state set X at time k as pik, pik(i) = P (x = i|Fk−1) for k ≥ 1.
The agent evaluates its belief recursively as follows
pik+1 =
B(ak)pik
1′B(ak)pik
, B(ak) = diag(vk) where
vk(i) =
{
(1− αak), for i = k
1, for i 6= k, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . |X |}. (16)
The belief pik is a |X |-dimensional probability vector. It lives in
the belief space ∆(X ), the |X |−1 dimensional unit simplex of
pmfs defined in (9). The agent chooses a policy µ : ∆(X )→ A
that determines the box to be searched at each time instant
based on the agent’s belief and incurs an expected cumulative
search cost defined as
J(µ) = Eµ

τ(µ)∑
k=0
cak
 , ak = µ(pik), pik ∈ ∆(X ).
Here, τ(µ) is an Fk−measurable stopping time (yτ(µ) = found)
induced by the policy µ. The optimal search policy µ∗ that
minimizes J(µ) is obtained via the following known result
using stochastic dynamic programming [32].
Proposition 3 ([32], Sec. 7.7.4). The optimal search policy
µ∗ for a Bayesian agent searching for a non-moving target is
given by
µ∗(pi) = argmax
i∈A
[
pi(i)αi
ci
]
, (17)
where pi denotes the belief of the agent, αi and ci denote the
reveal probability and search cost of box i.
Although somewhat tangential to our IRL focus, optimal
search for a moving target is an instance of a Bayesian multi-
armed bandit problem. The term pi(i)αi/ci in Proposition 3
6is the Gittins index [36] for the bandit problem. Hence, the
optimal policy for the agent is to search the box with the
highest Gittins index at any time instant k.
B. Optimal Search as Bayesian Utility Maximization
This section introduces a second Bayesian utility maximiza-
tion model through Definition 2. It is a generalization of the
action selection rule (6) for utility maximization in Definition 1.
We show that the optimal search policy can be written in terms
of the new model specified by Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Generalized Bayesian Utility Maximization).
A Bayesian agent is a utility maximizer if for given utility
functions u˜(x, a), u(x, a), the agent observes y ∈ Y from an
observation likelihood α and takes action a∗ ∈ A such that
the following inequality holds for all a ∈ A.∑
x∈X
p(x|y) (u˜(x, a∗)− u(x, a)) ≥ 0 (18)
The utility maximization model of Definition 2 is closely
related to the Bayesian persuasion model considered in [13],
[37] where the agent picks the action which yields the
maximum expected utility. Unlike Definition 1, a Bayesian
agent following the utility maximization model of Definition 2
only optimizes its action and not the observation likelihood α.
The action selection rule (18) in Definition 2 is more general
than (2) in Definition 1 since they are identical when u˜ = u.
Given dataset D (4) comprising observed state-action pairs
from a collection of M Bayesian agents, how to test if
the agents generating the action follow the action selection
rule (18) in Definition 2. In other words, do there exist
observation likelihoods αi and utility functions u˜i, ui for agent
i = 1, 2, . . .M which rationalize the dataset? If so, how to
estimate the agents’ utility functions {u˜i, ui, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M}}.
Theorem 2 below specifies a condition closely related to the
NIAS condition in Proposition 1 which is necessary and
sufficient for D to be consistent with utility maximization
behavior in the sense of Definition 2.
Theorem 2 (Generalized Bayesian Revealed Preference). The
dataset D (4) is consistent with a collection of M agents gener-
ating their actions according to (18) in Definition 2 iff the action
selection policy pk(a|x), utility functions uk(x, a), u˜(x, a) and
prior µ for agent k ∈ {1, 2 . . .M} satisfy the following linear
inequality:
NIAS∗({pk(a|x)}, {uk(x, a), uk(x, a)}, µ) ≤ 0 (19)
The NIAS∗ inequality in Theorem 2 can be interpreted
as an operator linear in the utility functions u˜, u. The proof
of Theorem 2 is in Appendix A. When the action selection
policies and prior of the agents are known, the inverse learner
can estimate the utility functions by solving a linear feasibility
problem outlined in Corollary 2 in the following subsection
with the constraint specified by NIAS∗. In the context of
Bayesian search, the NIAS∗ condition implies that the agent’s
actions are optimal according to the action selection rule (18).
Note that NIAS∗ is a generalization of the NIAS (6) condition
in Proposition 1. Specifically, when u˜(x, a) = u(x, a),∀x, a,
NIAS∗ specializes to the NIAS condition in Proposition 1.
Having proposed a generalized Bayesian utility maximization
model in Definition 2, we state Theorem 3 below which
specifies how the penultimate action choice (box searched
just prior to the target being discovered) for Bayesian search
in terms of the stopping belief follows the one-shot utility
maximization model of Definition 2. Given search policy µ,
prior pi0 and observation space Y = ∆(X ), define
αµ(ypi|x) = Pµ{piτ(µ) = pi|x}, ∀ypi ∈ Y, (20)
where τ(µ) is the Fk-measurable stopping time induced by
policy µ. In (20), αµ is an observation likelihood equal to the
pdf of the agent’s stopping belief for a fixed state and policy
µ. A more detailed discussion on the significance of αµ for
Theorem 3 below is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Consider a Bayesian agent searching for a non-
moving target using the optimal search policy µ in Theorem 3.
The penultimate action aτ−1 of the agent follows the action
selection rule (18) in Definition 2 with αµ (20) as the
observation likelihood and utility functions u˜(x, a) and u(x, a)
whose value is 0 for x 6= a, whereas for all a ∈ A,
u˜(a, a) =
αa
ca(1− αa) , u˜(a, a) =
αa
ca
.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix B. Theorem 3
shows that the penultimate box searched by the agent follows
the optimality condition (18) in Definition 2 when a single
observation is sampled from observation likelihood αµ. The
proof follows a similar approach from Sec. III where the
observation likelihood αµ abstracts the multi-step Bayesian
update of the agent till the target is found into a single-step
Bayesian update.
As will be discussed in the next section, the linear feasibility
test in Corollary 2 can be used to estimate the utilities
u˜(x, a) and u(x, a) of the agents which follow the model
in Definition 2.
C. IRL Estimation of the Search costs
With the above formulation of the search problem as a
static Bayesian revealed preferences problem (18), we can
now discuss the IRL algorithm for reconstructing the agent’s
search costs by observing its actions. We show that these search
costs of the agents can be estimated by the inverse learner by
solving a linear feasibility problem outlined in Corollary 2.
Theorem 3 in the previous subsection expresses the estimated
utility function of the equivalent one-shot optimization problem
for search in terms of the Gittins index and reveal probabilities
of the available boxes.
The inverse learner obtains dataset D (4) from M Bayesian
agents by recording the target location (x) and the penultimate
box searched (a) over K independent iterations for all M
agents and evaluates the action selection policies {pi(a|x), i ∈
{1, . . .M}} using (5). Recall from Theorem 2 that the NIAS∗
condition is linear in the utility functions u, u˜ of the agents.
Since the action selection policies and prior are known, the
agents’ utility functions can be estimated by solving a linear
feasibility problem as described below in Corollary 2 with the
NIAS∗ inequality as the only constraint.
7Corollary 2. The NIAS∗ condition in Theorem 2 can be
equivalently expressed as the following linear feasibility
problem:
Find u˜k(x, a), uk(x, a) > 0, ∀a ∈ A, k ∈ {1, 2 . . .M} such
that the following inequality holds
NIAS∗ :
∑
x∈X
pk(x|a)[u˜k(x, a)− uk(x, b)] ≥ 0 (21)
Since the observer is unaware of the agents’ true utility
functions u˜k(·), uk(·), Corollary 2 can be interpreted as a
constructive feasibility test for the inverse learner to estimate
u˜k(·), uk(·) such that the generated dataset D (4) is consistent
with the utility maximization model in Definition 2. The linear
feasibility problem of Corollary 2 can be solved by using the
simplex method [38], [39]. From Theorem 3, the inverse learner
knows how the estimated utility functions relate to the Gittins
indices and search costs of the agents which can be easily
evaluated once the linear feasibility problem in Corollary 2
is solved. Hence, Corollary 2 with the added constraints that
u˜k(x, a) = u(x, a) = 0, x 6= a solves the inverse search
problem of estimating the search costs of an optimal Bayesian
searcher.
V. INVERSE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR RATIONALLY
INATTENTIVE SEQUENTIAL HYPOTHESIS DETECTION
We now generalize the previous sections by considering IRL
where the sensor adapts its sensing mode dynamically over time.
Such sensing is often called ”controlled sensing”. By observing
the actions of a controlled sensor together with the prior and
input state, can we detect Bayesian rationality of a controlled
sensor? If so, can the utility functions be reconstructed?
Classical SHT in Sec. III is a special case of this controlled
sensing model where there is a single sensing mode and the
sensing cost is zero. The inverse problem is schematically
illustrated in Fig. 2. Our main conclusion is that like classical
SHT, the rationally inattentive detector’s optimal policy can be
expressed as a solution to the one-shot Bayesian optimization
problem (3). The inverse problem of estimating the rationally
inattentive detector’s stopping costs can be solved by using the
convex feasibility test in Corollary 1 based on the NIAS (6)
and NIAC (7) conditions for Bayesian utility maximization.
A. Rationally Inattentive Sequential Hypothesis Testing
Rationally inattentive sequential hypothesis testing is a
tuple (X ,Y,A,η, C, C˜) where X ,Y,A, C are identical to the
classical SHT model parameters in Sec. III-A. The parameters
η, C˜ are defined as
• η is a set of sensing modes available to the agent. If the
agent chooses η ∈ η, the agent’s next observation will be
sampled from pdf fη1 if the state is f1 and from f
η
2 if the
state is f2.
• C˜ : ∆(X )× η → R+, C˜(pi, η) is the rational inattention
cost incurred by the agent at any time k for choosing
sensing mode η when the belief state p(x|z1:k) is pi.
Unlike classical SHT, the agent takes two decisions at any
time. It chooses ak ∈ A which determines whether to continue
or stop and declare the underlying state. If ak = continue, the
agent takes a second action η ∈ η to specify the sensing mode
for the next observation.
Fix a time instant k > 0. The agent takes actions
ak and ηk based on the available information denoted as
Ik = {η0, z1, . . . ηk−1, zk}. Define Fk as the sigma-algebra
generated by Ik. The belief pik = p(x|Fk) evaluated recursively
by the agent via the Bayesian filter below is a sufficient statistic
for Ik [32]
pik =
B(zk, ηk−1)pik−1
1′B(zk, ηk−1)pik−1
, B(z, η) = diag({p(z|fηi )})
The belief pik is a |X | dimensional probability vector. It lives
in the belief space ∆(X), the |X |−1 dimensional unit simplex
of pmfs defined in (9).
The agent chooses a stationary policy µ : ∆(X )→ A×η to
determine its actions ak, ηk at time k = 1, 2, . . . given belief
pik to minimize the expected cumulative cost J(µ) defined as
J(µ) = Eµ{c τ(µ)+
τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
C˜(pik, ηk)+min
a∈X
pi′τ(µ)Ca}. (22)
In (22), τ(µ) is an Fk-measurable stopping time induced by the
policy µ, Ca is the stopping cost vector [C(f1, a) C(f2, a)]′.
The objective function in (22) comprises three terms: a
cumulative continue cost, a cumulative rational inattention
cost and a stopping cost.
We use the information theoretic model of a Shannon limited
capacity channel in [5] for the agent’s rational inattention cost
C˜. Specifically, C˜(pi, η) is the mutual information between the
random variables X distributed according to the agent’s belief
pi and Y whose observation likelihood is determined by the
sensing mode η.
C(pi, η) = H(X)− Eη {H(X|z)} , (X ∼ pi) (23)
In (23), H(X) denotes the information entropy of the random
variable X . The optimization problem in (22) can be solved
via stochastic dynamic programming [33]. The value function
V : ∆(X )→ R+ for the rationally inattentive SHT problem
is defined as the minimum expected cost incurred by the agent
given prior pi and satisfies Bellman’s equation for a partially
ordered Bayesian system [32].
V (pi) = min
{
pi′Cf1 , pi
′Cf2 , c+H(X) + min
η
V˜ (pi, η)
}
,
V˜ (pi, η) =Eη
{
V
(
B(z, η)pi
1′B(z, η)pi
)
−H(X|z)
}
, (24)
where X ∼ pi. Note that unlike classical SHT, the value
function V (·) (24) for rationally inattentive SHT involves
optimizing a second term V˜ (·) to determine the optimal sensing
mode η for the next measurement.
The added rational inattention cost in (24) does not affect
the expected stopping cost pi′Cfi (i = {1, 2}) which is linear
in the belief pi. The optimal stop/continue policy for linear stop
costs is well known to have a threshold structure like classical
SHT from Theorem 12.2.1 in [32]. The optimal sensing mode
together with the optimal stop/continue decision in terms of the
agent’s belief can be evaluated using the following theorem.
8Fig. 2. Schematic of the IRL framework for rationally inattentive sequential hypothesis testing. In addition to deciding whether to stop or continue (ak), the
agent also optimally chooses its sensing mode ηk at time k to trade-off between its information theoretic accuracy cost and the incurred state-action dependent
cost in this generalized hypothesis detection setup. Our main conclusion is that like classical SHT, the agent’s state-action dependent costs in this more general
setup can be estimated using a convex feasibility test that requires only the terminal actions aτ of the agent.
Theorem 4. For an agent performing rationally inattentive
sequential hypothesis testing, the optimal policy µ(pi) =
[a(pi) η(pi)] to determine the agent’s stop/continue action and
sensing mode for the next time instant when the current belief
is pi is given by the following rule.
1) The optimal stop/continue action a(pi) is given by the
following threshold rule similar to the optimal policy
structure specified in Proposition 2 for classical SHT
a(pi) =

stop, choose f2, if 0 ≤ pi(1) ≤ β
continue, if β ≤ pi(1) ≤ α
stop, choose f1, if α ≤ pi(1) ≤ 1.
The threshold values α and β indicate the minimum and
maximum value of pi(1) such that it is optimal to stop
and choose f1 and f2 respectively, i.e. ,
α = min p s.t. [p (1− p)]′Cf2 ≥ V ([p (1− p)]),
β = max p s.t. [p (1− p)]′Cf1 ≥ V ([p (1− p)]),
where V (·) denotes the value function for the rationally
inattentive SHT problem defined in (24).
2) The optimal sensing mode ηpi minimizes the sum of
the incurred rational inattention cost and the expected
cumulative cost incurred from the next time instant till the
agent stops. η(pi) can be obtained by solving the following
optimization problem
η(pi) = argmin
η
V˜ (pi),
where V˜ (·) is defined in (24).
The proof of Theorem 4 has been omitted since the results
can be easily derived from stochastic dynamic program-
ming [32]. Note that the above setup is more general compared
to classical SHT (10) since the rationally inattentive hypothesis
detecting agent solves an additional optimization problem to
determine its sensing mode for the next time instant.
B. Optimal Rationally Inattentive SHT as Bayesian Utility
Maximization
Theorem 5 shows that the multi-horizon sequential optimiza-
tion problem (22) can be expressed as the one-shot Bayesian
optimization problem (3). The key idea is to express the
expected sequentially accumulated cost of the agent till it
stops in terms of the pdf of the agent’s stopping belief.
Given policy µ, prior pi0 and observation space Y = ∆(X ),
define
αµ(ypi|x) =Pµ{piτ(µ) = pi|x}, ∀ypi ∈ Y, (25)
R(αµ) =c Eµ{τ(µ)}+H(X)− Eαµ{H(X|y)}, (26)
where the random variable X ∼ pi0 and τ(µ) is the Fk-
measurable stopping time induced by policy µ. In (25), αµ
is an observation likelihood equal to the pdf of the agent’s
stopping belief for a fixed state and policy µ. Further discussion
on the construction of αµ is provided in Appendix C. The term
R(αµ) in (26) will be interpreted in Theorem 5 below as the
information cost for choosing observation likelihood αµ.
Theorem 5. Given an agent with known prior pi0 using optimal
policy µ∗ for rationally inattentive SHT. The observation likeli-
hood αµ∗ defined in (25) is the solution to the static Bayesian
optimization problem (3) where the information acquisition
cost for choosing likelihood α is given by R(α) (26).
αµ∗ ∈ argmax
µ
Eαµ,pi0{maxA
∑
X
p(x|y)u(x, a)} −R(αµ).
The utility function u(x, a) maximized by the agent is the
negative of the cost C(x, a) (22) incurred for taking action a
in state x.
The proof of Theorem 5 is in Appendix C. The key idea is
that the expected stop cost and cumulative rational inattention
cost for a policy µ can be expressed only in terms of the
prior pi0 and the measure αµ. The optimal choice of sensing
mode and decision to stop or continue determined by the
policy µ∗ is abstracted to a single likelihood function αµ∗ with
respect to which the agent maximizes its expected utility less
an information acquisition cost.
The IRL framework for rationally inattentive SHT is identical
to that of classical SHT as described in Sec. III-C which
requires as input only the state and the corresponding stopping
action of the Bayesian agents. The convex feasibility test in
Corollary 1 along with the added constraints u(x, x) = 0, x ∈
X solves the inverse rationally inattentive sequential hypothesis
testing problem of detecting the agent’s incurred costs.
9VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we demonstrate using numerical examples
how Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 generate set-valued estimates
of the Bayesian agents’ stopping and search costs. Our main
finding is that the feasible set output from the tests contains
the true stopping/search costs of the agents.
A. Bayesian Sequential Hypothesis Testing
We generate our simulation-based dataset D (4) comprising
M = 3 agents and using the following parameters for the SHT
problem described in Sec. III.
Hypotheses: f1 = N (1, 2), f2 = N (−1, 2),
pi0 : [0.5 0.5],
Continue cost : 1,
Stopping costs
Agent 1 : C1(1, 2) = 2; C2(2, 1) = 2.5,
Agent 2 : C2(1, 2) = 4; C2(2, 1) = 3,
Agent 2 : C3(1, 2) = 6; C3(2, 1) = 6.
The inverse SHT problem involves estimating the costs Ci(1, 2)
and Ci(2, 1) for agents i = 1, 2, 3 using the convex feasibility
test in Corollary 1. The action selection policies {pi(a|x), i ∈
{1, 2, . . .M}} (i indexes the agent) for Corollary 1 are
evaluated using (5). The feasible set of costs, F ⊆ R6+,
hence for better visualization, we plot in Fig. 3 the set of
feasible stopping costs for a single agent at a time keeping
the stopping costs for the other two agents fixed at their true
values. In Fig. 3, the true stopping costs for each agent are
highlighted by a yellow point. We see that these true costs
lie in the interior of the set of costs which satisfy the convex
inequalities in Corollary 1. Hence, the inverse reinforcement
learning procedure in Corollary 1 successfully performs inverse
sequential hypothesis testing.
Fig. 3. The true stopping costs of the agents performing SHT (yellow points)
lies in the feasible set of stopping costs (blue region) obtained from the convex
feasibility test in Corollary 1. Hence, the proposed IRL scheme in Sec. III can
be used for set-valued estimation of the agents’ stopping costs unknown to
the observer.
B. Bayesian Sequential Search
We generate our simulation-based dataset D (4) comprising
M = 1 agent with N = 3 boxes and using the following
Fig. 4. The true search costs (highlighted as a yellow point) of the Bayesian
agent lies in the feasible set of stopping costs (blue region) obtained from the
feasibility test in Corollary 2. Hence, the proposed IRL scheme in Sec. IV can
be used for set-valued estimation of the agent’s search costs unknown to the
observer.
parameters for the Bayesian search problem described in
Sec. IV.
pi0 : [0.32 0.33 0.35],
Reveal Probabilities :
Box 1 : α1 = 0.65, Box 2 : α2 = 0.77, Box 3 : α3 = 0.85,
Search costs :
Box 1 : c1 = 5, Box 2 : c2 = 6, Box 3 : c3 = 7.
The inverse search problem involves estimating the reveal
probability αi and search cost ci for boxes i = 1, 2, 3. The
action selection policy p(a|x) for Corollary 2 is evaluated
using (5). The optimal search policy in Proposition 3 depends
only on the relative search costs of the boxes. Hence, without
loss of generality, we can set c1 to 1 and estimate the
normalized costs c2/c1, c3/c1 for boxes 2 and 3 respectively.
The feasible set of estimated parameters, F ⊆ [0, 1]2 × R3+,
hence for better visualization, we assume the inverse learner
knows {αi, i = 1, 2, 3} and plot in Fig. 4 the feasible set of
normalized costs (c2/c1, c3/c1) shown as the blue region which
satisfy the convex inequalities in Corollary 1. In Fig. 4, the
true search costs for box 2 and 3 are highlighted by a yellow
point which lie inside the feasible set. Hence, the inverse
reinforcement learning procedure in Corollary 2 successfully
performs inverse search.
VII. INVERSE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING TO DETECT
BAYESIAN UTILITY MAXIMIZATION IN NOISE
Thus far, we have constructed an IRL framework for
Bayesian agents when their decisions are observed exactly. This
section constructs statistical detectors for IRL when the agents’
decisions are observed in noise. We propose two statistical
hypothesis tests schematically shown in Fig. 5 to detect if the
agents are rationally inattentive in the sense of Proposition 1.
This involves testing the convex feasibility of the NIAS (6)
and NIAC (7) inequalities in Definition 1 when the action
selection policies p(a|x) (5) of the agents are corrupted by
noise. We then enhance the tests and present an active inverse
reinforcement learning algorithm that optimizes the agents’
prior to minimize the error probability of the tests.
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Suppose the inverse learner records noisy action aˆ from agent
i ∈ {1, 2 . . . ,M} given state x ∈ X distributed according to a
random pmf pi(aˆ|x). The random pmf pi(aˆ|x) is assumed to
be distributed uniformly over a normal ball of known radius
xi centered at the true pmf pi(a|x) in the |A|− 1 dimensional
unit simplex of pmfs. Further, we assume that the random
pmfs pi(aˆ|x) are independent across states and agents. The
state-action pairs recorded by the inverse learner are aggregated
into the noisy dataset Dˆ defined as
Dˆ = {(xik, aˆik), k ∈ {1, . . .K}, i ∈ {1, . . .M}}. (27)
From Dˆ (27), the inverse learner uses (5) to obtain the noisy
pmfs {pi(aˆ|x), i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M}}. The aim of the inverse
learner is given the noisy pmfs and prior µ of the agents,
how to detect if their observed decisions are consistent with
rationally inattentive utility maximization behavior.
Fig. 5. Schematic of the proposed statistical hypothesis test to detect rational
inattention in Bayesian agents when the agents’ actions are observed in noise.
The test’s performance (upper bound on Type-I error probability) can be tuned
by the user via a pre-defined significance level.
We propose two statistical hypothesis tests where
• H0 denotes the null hypothesis that the clean dataset D
in (4) satisfies utility maximization.
• H1 denotes the alternative hypothesis that D does not
satisfy utility maximization.
While testing for H1 against H0, we encounter two types of
error:
Type-I error : Reject H0 when H0 is valid
Type-II error : Fail to reject H0 when H1 is valid
The first test bounds the false alert (Type-I) probability of
classifying the Bayesian agents to be rationally inattentive when
they are not. The second test bounds the missed alarm (Type-II)
probability of classifying the Bayesian agents as not rationally
inattentive when the ground truth is otherwise.
A. Statistical Test for Agents Maximizing their Expected Utility
1) Test 1 for upper bounding Type-I error: Given the noisy
dataset Dˆ (27) from M Bayesian agents, we consider the
following statistical test to detect if the agents are rationally
inattentive in the sense of Proposition 1:
Test 1 :
∫ ∞
ψ1(Dˆ)
fL(β)dβ
H1
≶
H0
α . (28)
In Test 1 (28):
i) α is the “significance level” of the test.
ii) The ‘test statistic’ ψ1(Dˆ) is the solution of the following
constrained optimization problem
min
M∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
‖pˆk(aˆ|x)− pk(aˆ|x)‖ (29)
(‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm between
vectorized probability mass functions.)
s.t. ∃uk(x, a) ∈ R+, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} which satisfy
(1) NIAS({pˆk(aˆ|x)}, {uk(x, aˆ), µ}) ≤ 0
(2) NIAC({pˆk(aˆ|x)}, {uk(x, aˆ), µ}) ≤ 0
iii) fL is the pdf of the random variable L where
L =
M∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
(δxk − c). (30)
δxk ∈ |A| − 1 dimensional unit simplex of pmfs (9) is
uniformly distributed in a xk-norm ball centered at c set
to { 1|A| , 1|A| , . . . 1|A|}.
The test statistic ψ1(Dˆ) is the minimum perturbation needed
for the conditional pmfs {pk(aˆ|x)} to satisfy the NIAS and
NIAC conditions (6,7) for utility maximization behavior.
The following theorem analytically characterizes the Type-I
error probability (accepting the alternate hypothesis H1 when
the null hypothesis H0 holds) of this test.
Theorem 6. Given the noisy dataset Dˆ, the Type-I error
probability (reject H0, when H0 is true) of Test 1 (28) is
less than α.
The proof for Theorem 6 is in Appendix D.
2) Test 2 for upper bounding Type-II error: In the previous
sub-section, Test 1 (28) ensures the Type-I error probability
lies under a pre-defined significance level. Here, we consider
another version of this test which upper bounds the Type-II
error probability. Given the noisy dataset Dˆ from M agents
in (27), consider the following statistical test to detect Bayesian
utility maximization:
Test 2 :
∫ ∞
ψ2(Dˆ)
fL(β)dβ
H1
≶
H0
α . (31)
In Test 2 (31):
i) α is the “significance level” of the test.
ii) The ‘test statistic’ ψ2(Dˆ) is the solution of the following
constrained optimization problem
min
M∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
‖pˆk(aˆ|x)− pk(aˆ|x)‖ (32)
s.t. ∗(pˆ) < 0. (33)
(‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm between
vectorized probability mass functions.)
∗(pˆ) = max ,  ∈ R
s.t. ∃uk(x, a) ∈ R+, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} which satisfy
(1) NIAS({pˆk(aˆ|x)}, {uk(x, aˆ), µ}) ≤ −
(2) NIAC({pˆk(aˆ|x)}, {uk(x, aˆ), µ}) ≤ −
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iii) fL is the pdf of the random variable L where
L =
M∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
(δxk − c). (34)
δxk ∈ |A| − 1 dimensional unit simplex of pmfs (9) is
uniformly distributed in a xk-norm ball centered at c set
to { 1|A| , 1|A| , . . . 1|A|}.
The test statistic ψ2(Dˆ) is the minimum perturbation needed
for the conditional pmfs {pk(aˆ|x)} such that atleast one of
the NIAS and NIAC conditions (6,7) for utility maximization
behavior is not satisfied.
The following theorem analytically characterizes the Type-II
error probability (accepting the null hypothesis H0 when the
alternate hypothesis H1 holds) of this test.
Theorem 7. Given the noisy dataset Dˆ, the Type-II error
probability (reject H1, when H1 is true) of Test 2 (31) is less
than α.
The proof for Theorem 7 is identical to Theorem 6 proved
in Appendix D. One only needs to replace ψ1(·) with ψ2(·)
and interchange H1 and H0.
Fig. 6. Schematic representation of active inverse reinforcement learning
algorithm for the detector Test 1 (28). The aim is to solve the stochastic
optimization problem (37) and achieve the optimal prior that minimizes the
Type-II error probability of Test 1.
B. Active Inverse RL: Optimizing the Prior to minimize Type-II/
Type-I error
We proposed two statistical tests Test 1 (28) and Test 2 (31)
in the previous sub-section to detect utility maximization in
Bayesian agents when the actions are observed in noise. In
this subsection, we enhance these tests and design a stochastic
controller that
1) Minimizes the Type-II error probability of Test 1 whose
Type-I error probability is bounded,
2) Minimizes the Type-I error probability of Test 2 whose
Type-II error probability is bounded.
The stochastic controller adaptively tunes the agents’ prior µ
to achieve the above objectives. The controller’s optimization
is shown schematically in Fig. 6.
Let us first consider Test 1. For a fixed set of Bayesian
agents, we want to estimate the prior µ∗ which minimizes the
Type-II error probability in Test 1 (28)
µ∗ = argmin
µ∈∆(X )
J(µ)
= P
[∫ ∞
ψ1(Dˆ(µ))
fL(β)dβ > α | H1
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-II Error
(35)
The above constrained stochastic optimization over ∆(X ) can
be reformulated as an unconstrained optimization over R|X |−1
by parametrizing µ as follows:
µk =µ(Θk) = [µk(1) µk(2) . . . µk(|X |)], Θk ∈ R|X |−1
µk(i) = cos
2 θi
i−1∏
k=1
sin2 θk i ∈ {1, 2 . . . |X | − 1},
µk(|X |) =
|X |−1∏
k=1
sin2 θk. (36)
This parametrization ensures that µk(i) ∈ [0, 1] for Θk ∈
R|X |−1.
We can then perform an unconstrained optimization over
R|X |−1 to estimate a local minimizer of J(µ) (35) using a
stochastic gradient algorithm [32]
Θk+1 = Θk − ηk ∇ˆ(J(µ(Θk))),∇(J(µ(Θ))) = ∂J(µ(Θ))
∂Θ
.
Since the pdf fL is not known explicitly, (35) comprises a
simulation based stochastic optimization problem. We use the
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA)
algorithm [40], [41] to design Algorithm 1 which generates
optimal parameters Θ∗1, Θ
∗
2 ∈ R|X |−1 for Test 1 (28) and
Test 2 (31) which minimizes their Type-II and Type-I error
probability respectively.
Θ∗1 = argmin
Θ
J1(µ(Θ))
= P
[∫ ∞
ψ1(Dˆ(Θ))
fL(β)dβ > α | H1
]
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-II Error for Test 1
Θ∗2 = argmin
Θ
J2(µ(Θ))
= P
[∫ ∞
ψ2(Dˆ(Θ))
fL(β)dβ > α | H0
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-I Error for Test 2
(37)
The random variables ψ1(Dˆ(Θ)) and ψ2(Dˆ(Θ)) in (37) are the
test statistics defined in (29) and (32) given prior µ(Θ) (36). For
decreasing step size ηi,k = 1/k (i ∈ {1, 2}) in Algorithm 1, the
SPSA algorithm converges to a local minimum of J(Θ) with
probability 1. For constant step size ηi,k = η > 0 (i ∈ {1, 2}),
it converges weakly in probability (see [41] for a detailed
exposition).
Summary: In this section, using a simulation based stochastic
optimization algorithm (Algorithm 1), we obtained the agents’
optimal priors which minimizes the Type-II and Type-I error
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probability of detecting rationally inattentive utility maximiza-
tion behavior using Test 1 (28) and Test 2 (31) respectively.
Algorithm 1 Active IRL using SPSA
Step 1) Choose parameters Θ10, Θ20 ∈ [0, 2pi]|X |−1 for the
initial prior distributions of Test 1 and Test 2 respectively.
Step 2) For iterations k = 0, 1, 2 . . . , execute the following
steps.
1) (a) Estimate the Type-II error probability J1,k(µ(Θ1k)) of
Test 1 in (37) as
Jˆ1,k(µ(Θ
1
k)) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
1{FL(ψ1(Dˆ1,r(Θ1k))) ≤ 1− α}
(b) Estimate the Type-I error probability J2,k(µ(Θ2k)) of
Test 2 in (37) as
Jˆ2,k(µ(Θ
2
k)) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
1{FL(ψ2(Dˆ2,r(Θ2k))) ≤ 1− α}
where Dˆ1,r and Dˆ2,r denote the noisy datasets generated
at the rth iteration by utility maximizing and non-utility
maximizing Bayesian agents respectively with specified
prior µ(Θk). The variables ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) are test
statistics for Test 1 and Test 2 defined in (28), FL(·)
is an estimate of the cdf of random variable L defined
in (30). The parameter R controls the accuracy of the
empirical probability of Type-II/Type-I errors.
2) Compute the gradient estimates ∇ˆkJˆ1,k(Θ1k) and
∇ˆkJˆ2,k(Θ2k) for updating Θ1k and Θ2k
∇ˆkJˆ1,k(Θ1k) =
Jˆ1,k(Θ
1
k + ω∆
k
1)− Jˆ1,k(Θ1k − ω∆k1)
2ω‖∆k1‖
∇ˆkJˆ2,k(Θ2k) =
Jˆ2,k(Θ
2
k + ω∆
k
2)− Jˆ2,k(Θ2k − ω∆k2)
2ω‖∆k2‖
.
In the above gradient estimates,
∆k1(i), ∆
k
2(i) =
{
+1 with probability 0.5
−1 with probability 0.5
and gradient step size ω > 0.
3) Update the parameters with step size η1,k, η2,k > 0 as
Θ1k+1 = Θ
1
k − η1,k ∇ˆkJˆ1,k(Θ1k)
Θ2k+1 = Θ
2
k − η2,k ∇ˆkJˆ2,k(Θ2k)
VIII. FINITE SAMPLE PERFOMANCE ANALYSIS FOR
DETECTING BAYESIAN UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
This section considers detecting utility maximization be-
havior in Bayesian agents when the inverse learner obtains
finitely many noisy observations from the agents. The statistical
hypothesis tests (Test 1 and Test 2) proposed in Sec. VII take
in as input the noisy pmfs {pi(aˆ|x)} and detect whether the
actions are consistent with utility maximization behavior. In
reality, its not possible to get the exact pmfs {pi(a|x)} since
they are empirically computed by the inverse learner. In this
section, we look at the sensitivity of the performance of the
tests (namely, Type-I and Type-II error probability of Test 1
and Test 2) to finite sample size of the obtained dataset Dˆ.
Suppose the inverse learner records N observations from
the agents. The main result in Theorem 8 uses the Dvoretzky-
Kiefer-Wolowitz (DKW) [42], [43] concentration inequality
to show that within an h() interval, the performance of
the statistical hypothesis tests in Sec. VII is bounded with
probability at least 1− g(,N). The functions h(·), g(·) are
explicitly defined later in this section.
Fig. 7. Schematic of the sample complexity result on the performance of the
statistical test in Fig. 5. The finite sample size is interpreted as an error in
addition to measurement noise. The main aim is to bound on the error in the
Type-I error probability bound of the test arising in a finite dataset.
For a collection of M Bayesian agents, let Ni(x) (i ∈
{1, 2 . . .M}, x ∈ X ) denote the number of state-action pairs
in the dataset Dˆ (27) obtained from agent i when the state is x.
Let Fi(aˆ|x) and F ei (aˆ|x) denote the cumulative mass functions
of the true and empirical pmfs pi(aˆ|x) and pei (aˆ|x) respectively.
The two-sided DKW inequality bounds the deviation of the
empirical cmf F ei (·|x) from the true cmf Fi(·|x) within a
distance of  > 0 in terms of the number of samples used to
construct pei (aˆ|x).
P
(
max
aˆ∈A
|F ei (aˆ|x)− Fi(aˆ|x)| > 
)
≤ 2 e−2Ni(x)2 . (38)
The DKW inequality applies to i.i.d random variables. The i.i.d
requirement is fulfilled since the observed actions of the agents
for a fixed state are independent and identically distributed
over iterations. Recall from Sec. VII that the inverse learner
evaluates test statistics ψ1(·) and ψ2(·) in Test 1 (28) and
Test 1 (31) respectively using pmfs {pi(aˆ|x)} to detect if the
Bayesian agents are rationally inattentive or not. The key idea
behind the proof of Theorem 8 in Appendix E is to use the
DKW inequality (38) to bound the difference between ψu(·)
and its empirical counterpart ψeu(·) (u ∈ {1, 2}) obtained from
{pei (aˆ|x)} which determine the Type-I/II error probabilities of
the tests.
For a fixed significance level α, noise r.v. L (30) and error
 > 0, define
hα() =
∫ M |X |√|A|
0
fL(β + Cα)dβ,
g(, {Ni(x)}) = 2
∑
i,x
e−2Ni(x)
2
. (39)
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Here, Cα is the (1 − α)−quantile level for the pdf fL (30).
In (39), the term hα() is the maximum admissible margin
in the Type-I/II error probability bound α and g(, ·) upper
bounds the probability that the Type-I/II error probability lies
outside the interval [0, α+ hα()].
Theorem 8. Let Ni(x) state-action pairs be recorded from
agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M} such that the state is x. Then, for any
 > 0 and predefined significance level α
• The Type-I error probability γ1 of the test in (28) is
upper bounded by α+hα() with probability greater than
1− g(, {Ni(x)}), where g, h are defined in (39)
P
(
γ1 ≤ α+ hα()
)
≥ 1− g(, {Ni(x)}).
• The Type-II error probability γ2 of the test in (31) is
upper bounded by α+hα() with probability greater than
1− g(, {Ni(x)}), where g, h are defined in (39)
P
(
γ2 ≤ α+ hα()
)
≥ 1− g(, {Ni(x)}).
The proof of Theorem 8 is in Appendix E. Theorem 8 is
useful from a practical point of view where the data available
to the inverse learner is finite. It provides a probabilistic bound
on the performance of the statistical hypothesis tests in Sec. VII
in terms of the size of the observation dataset. If an inverse
learner uses the tests to detecting utility maximization behavior
in Bayesian agents given a finite dataset, it can compute using
Theorem 8 the degree of confidence its probability of incorrectly
detecting whether the agents are rational or not lies under a
specified threshold level.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper studied a novel class of inverse reinforcement
learning methods in partially observed environments. It consid-
ered agents performing multi-horizon optimization problems,
namely, sequential hypothesis testing and Bayesian search and
provided algorithms to estimate their stopping/search costs.
The main ideas in this paper involve Bayesian Revealed Prefer-
ences and Rational Inattention. Bayesian Revealed Preferences
addresses the deeper issue of the existence of a utility function
that rationalizes the given data compared to classical inverse
reinforcement learning where the existence of such a function is
implicitly assumed. Estimating costs of such agents is important
in adversarial inference, social multimedia platforms and human
robot interface systems.
The main results of this paper involve
1) Specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the
decisions taken by a collection of Bayesian agents to
be consistent with rationally inattentive utility maximiza-
tion (Proposition 1 and Theorem 2).
2) Embedding sequential hypothesis testing and Bayesian
search into the static Bayesian optimization framework
of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 to generate set-valued
estimates of the agents’ stopping/search costs via convex
feasibility tests Corollary 1 and 2.
3) Proposing statistical hypothesis tests with bounded Type-
I and Type-II error probabilities for detecting utility
maximization behavior in Bayesian agents when their
decisions are observed in noise.
4) Proposing an active IRL framework (Algorithm 1) to
achieve the optimal prior which minimizes the Type-II
and Type-I error probability of the tests in (3).
5) Providing a sample complexity result (Theorem 8) to
characterize the finite sample performance of the statistical
hypothesis tests in (3).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Recall we defined the NIAS∗ condition (18) as a general-
ization of the classical NIAS condition in (6).
Proof of necessity of NIAS∗: Consider any belief p(x|y) (y
denotes the agent’s observation) such that action a ∈ A is
chosen by the agent i.e.
∑
x∈X p(x|y)(u˜(x, a) − u(x, b)) ≥
0, ∀b 6= a. The revealed belief p(x|a) (defined in (18)) is a
stochastically garbled version of the actual belief p(x|y) i.e.,
p(x|a) =
∑
y
p(a|y)p(y)p(x|y)
p(a)
=
∑
y
p(a, y)
p(a)
p(x|y) =
∑
y
p(y|a)p(x|y)
where α is the observation likelihood of the agent defined
in (3). Since the optimal action is a, the following holds from
optimality for all a ∈ A∑
x∈X
p(x|y)(u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)) ≥ 0, ∀b 6= a
=⇒
∑
y
p(y|a)
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)(u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)) ≥ 0
=⇒
∑
x∈X
(∑
y
p(y|a)p(x|y)
)
(u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)) ≥ 0
=⇒
∑
x∈X
p(x|a)(u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)) ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ A, b 6= a
Proof of sufficiency of NIAS∗: By assuming a one-to-one
mapping from the set of observations Y to the set of actions A
implies p(y|a) = 1{y = ya} and α(ya|x) = α(a|x). Thus, we
show that the NIAS∗ condition (18) in Theorem 2 implies (19)
in Definition 2.∑
x∈X
p(x|a) [u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)] ≥ 0, ∀a, b ∈ A, b 6= a
=
∑
y
∑
x∈X
p(a, y, x)
p(a)
[u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)] ≥ 0
=
∑
y
p(a|y)p(y)
p(a)
[∑
x∈X
p(x|y) [u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)]
]
≥ 0
=
∑
y
p(y|a)
[∑
x∈X
p(x|y) [u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)]
]
≥ 0
=⇒
∑
x∈X
p(x|a) [u˜(x, a)− u(x, b)] ≥ 0 (∵ p(ya|a) = 1)
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Consider the box aτ−1 searched by the agent before the
final box aτ is searched to reveal the target. τ denotes the
Fk-measurable stopping time which specifies the termination
of the Bayesian search problem, i.e. , the time instant when
the agent discovers the target. The belief piτ−1 can be written
in terms of the stopping belief piτ using (16) as follows
piτ (aτ−1) = Kτ piτ−1(aτ−1) (1− αaτ−1),
piτ (i) = Kτ piτ−1(i), i 6= aτ−1.
=⇒ piτ−1(aτ−1) = Kτ−1 piτ/(1− αaτ−1),
piτ−1(i) = Kτ−1 piτ (i), i 6= aτ−1. (40)
In the above equation, Kτ , Kτ−1 ∈ R+ are proportionality
constants. Define Ui = (αi/ci) ei, U˜i = (αi/(1− αi) ci) ei
where ei ∈ R|X | is a vector whose ith coordinate equals 1 and
the remaining entries are set to 0. The second last search box
aτ−1 satisfies the following condition
aτ−1 = argmax
i∈A
[
piτ−1(i)αi
ci
]
=⇒ piτ−1(aτ−1)
αaτ−1
caτ−1
≥ piτ−1(i) αi
ci
, ∀ i 6= aτ−1
=⇒ piτ (aτ−1)
αaτ−1
caτ−1 (1− αaτ−1)
≥ piτ (i) αi
ci
, ∀i 6= aτ−1
=⇒ pi′τ U˜aτ−1 ≥ pi′τUi, ∀i 6= aτ−1
Hence, for any stopping belief pi ∈ ∆(X ), the optimal
action (second last box to search) can be written as
aτ−1 = a∗(pi) ∈ {a ∈ A| pi′(U˜a − Ub) ≥ 0, ∀ b 6= a}, (41)
where U˜a = [{u˜(x, a)}Nx=1]′, Ua = [{u(x, a)}Nx=1]′.
Recall from Definition 2 that the agent records a single
observation sampled from an observation likelihood and
optimally takes an action according to (18). The observation
likelihood αµ(ypi|x) over the space Y is defined as
diag({αµ(ypi|x)}) =
∑
ηµ:piτ(ηµ)=pi
τ(ηµ)∏
k=1
B(ak(ηµ))

∀ypi ∈ Y.
τ(ηµ) = min {k ≥ 1 : yk(ηµ) ∈ A}. (42)
In (42), ηµ is a sequence of boxes a1, a2, . . . searched by
the agent such that ak = µ(p(x|Ik−1)). The matrix B(·) is
the observation likelihood matrix in (16). It can be shown
using (45) that p(x|ypi) = pi(x). Thus, the agent’s penultimate
box search policy is equivalent to sampling a single observation
from the αµ (42) and choosing the optimal action based on
the belief according to (41).
APPENDIX C
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The proof can be divided into 3 steps:
Step 1. Reformulation of the expected stopping cost: The
expected stopping cost in (22) under policy µ can be written
as
Eµ{min
a∈X
pi′τ(µ)Ca}
=
∑
pi∈∆(X)
[∑
x∈X
P(piτ(µ) = pi|x)pi0(x)
]
min
a∈X
pi′Ca (43)
The stopping belief state piτ of the agent is a result of
multiple Bayesian updates from time 0 till τ − 1. We define an
observation likelihood αµ for policy µ such that a multi-step
Bayesian update of the agent’s belief by recording a sequence
of observations is equivalent to a single-step Bayesian update by
the agent with prior pi0 where a single observation is sampled
from αµ. We construct the observation likelihood αµ over
Y = ∆(X ) such that the probability of sampling any element
ypi ∈ Y is equal to the probability of the stopping belief being
pi. It is equal to the likelihood of all observation sequences
z¯ under policy µ such that the agent’s multi-step Bayesian
update of the state is pi. αµ is defined below
diag({αµ(ypi|x)}) =
∑
z¯:piτ(µ)=pi
τ(µ)∏
k=1
B(zk, η(pik−1))
 .
(pik = p(x|Ik)), ∀ypi ∈ Y s.t. a(pi) ∈ X , and
αµ(ypi|x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X , ypi ∈ Y s.t. a(pi) = continue. (44)
In other words, given state x and policy µ, αµ(ypi|x) is the
probability that when the agent stops and chooses a hypothesis,
the belief is pi. Using Bayes’ rule, it is straightforward to show
that whenever ypi is sampled from αµ, the belief updated by
the agent according to (8) is pi.
pµ(x|ypi) = αµ(ypi|x)pi0(x)
pµ(ypi)
=
∑
z¯:piτµ(z¯)=pi
p(z¯|x, η1:τ(µ))pi0(x)/pµ(ypi)
=
∑
z¯:piτµ(z¯)=pi
p(x, z¯|η1:τ(µ))
pµ(z¯)
pµ(z¯)
pµ(ypi)
= pi(x)
∑
z¯:piτµ(z¯))=pi
pµ(z¯)/pµ(ypi) = pi(x) (45)
The expected stopping cost (43) can thus be reformulated in
terms of αµ as
Eµ{min
a∈X
pi′τ(µ)Ca} = Eαµ{min
a∈X
T (pi0, ypi)
′Ca},
where T (pi, ypi) =
diag({αµ(ypi|x)})pi0
1′ diag({αµ(ypi|x)})pi0 .
Step 2. Reformulation of cumulative mutual information cost:
We reformulate the cumulative expected mutual information
cost incurred by the agent in (22) in terms of the observation
likelihood α defined in (44). In the following equations,
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I(X,Y ) denotes the mutual information between random
variables X and Y .
Eµ

τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
I(Xk, Zk)
 , Xk, Zk ∼ pik,∑X pik(x)p(·|x, ηk)
=Eµ

τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
H(Xk)− Ezk{H(Xk|zk)}

=Eµ

τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
H(X0|z1:k)−H(X0|z1:k+1)

=Eµ
{
H(X0)−H(X0|z1:τ(µ))
}
(telescopic sum)
=H(X0)− Eµ{H(X0|z1:τ(µ))} = H(X0)− Eµ{H(Xτ(µ))}
=H(X0)− Eαµ{H(X0|ypi)}.
Note that
Eαµ{H(X0|ypi)} = H(X0|Y ), Y ∼
∑
X
pi0(x)αµ(·|x).
Therefore,
RI(αµ) = Eµ

τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
C˜(pik, ηk)
 = I(X,Y ), where
X ∼ pi0, Y ∼
∑
X
pi0(x)αµ(·|x). (46)
Thus, the agent’s expected cumulative rational inattention cost
RI(αµ) is the mutual information between the random state at
time 0 distributed according to pi0 and the random observation
whose likelihood is αµ.
Step 3. Converting multi-horizon optimization over policies µ
into a static optimization problem over observation likelihoods
αµ: Define
R(αµ) = c Eµ{τ(µ)}+RI(αµ),
where RI(·) is the expected cumulative rational inattention
cost defined in (46). Therefore, the following results from
optimality of policy choice
µ∗ ∈ argmin
µ
Eµ{c τ(µ) +
τ(µ)−1∑
k=0
C˜(pik, ηk) + min
a∈X
pi′τ(µ)Ca}
=⇒ αµ∗ ∈ argmax
α
Eα{max
a∈X
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)u(x, a)} −R(α),
u(x, a) = −C(x, a), ∀x, a ∈ X . (47)
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Suppose the null hypothesis H0 holds. Define ψ, the error
between the noisy dataset Dˆ in (27) and the clean dataset D
in (4), as
ψ =
M∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
‖pk(a|x)− pk(aˆ|x)‖. (48)
Here, ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm between vectorized pmfs
in the |A|−1 dimensional unit simplex. Clearly, if H0 is valid,
ψ ≥ ψ1(Dˆ) in (29). The Type-I error (P(accepting H1|H0))
can be bounded from above by the significance value α in (29)
as shown below
P(H1|H0) = P(
∫ ∞
ψ1(Dˆ)
fM (β)dβ ≤ α)
= P(ψ1(Dˆ) ≥ Cα) ≤ P(ψ ≥ Cα)
= P(L ≥ Cα) (∵ ψ ∼ fL (30))
=
∫ ∞
Cα
fL(β)dβ = α
Therefore, P(H1|H0) ≤ α . (49)
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We prove the result for Test 1 (28) which ensures an upper
bound on the Type-I error probability. The result for Test 2
in (31) can be proved similarly and omitted for brevity.
The first part of the proof is to bound the cumulative
deviation of the noisy pmfs {pi(aˆ|x)} from their empirical
counterparts {pei (aˆ|x)}. Recall that aˆ is a measurement of the
true action a taken by the agent. Fix agent i ∈ {1, 2 . . .M}
and state x ∈ X . Let Fi(aˆ|x) and F ei (aˆ|x) denote the cdfs cor-
responding to pi(aˆ|x) and pei (aˆ|x). From DKW inequality [42],
[43] it follows that for  > 0 and η(i, x) = 1− 2 e−2Ni(x)2 ,
η(i, x) ≤ P
(
max
aˆ∈A
|F ei (aˆ|x)− Fi(aˆ|x)| ≤ 
)
≤ P (|pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)| ≤ , ∀aˆ ∈ A)
≤ P
(
‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖ ≤
√
|A|
)
(50)
Define d() =
∑
i,x
√|A| = M |X |√|A|. Since the random
variables ‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖ are independent over agents i =
1, 2, . . .M and states x ∈ X , we can combine the inequality
in (50) for all i, x to obtain the following bound
P
∑
i,x
‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖ ≤ d()
 ≥∏
i,x
η(i, x) (51)
The term on the right in (51) can be bounded from below as∏
i,x
η(i, x) ≥ 1− 2
∑
i,x
e−2Ni(x)
2
= g(, {Ni(x)})
and can be combined with (51) to give the following result.
P
∑
i,x
‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖ ≥ d()
 ≤ g(, {Ni(x)}).
(52)
The second part of the proof involves bounding the dif-
ference between the test statistic ψ1(Dˆ) defined in (29)
and its empirical counterpart ψ̂1(Dˆ) obtained by replacing
pi(aˆ|x) with pei (aˆ|x) in (29). Let {p∗i (aˆ|x)}i,x denote the
pmfs minimally perturbed from the true pmfs {pi(aˆ|x)}
that satisfy the NIAS and NIAC inequalities for rationally
inattentive utility maximization. Hence, from (29), ψ1(Dˆ) =
16
∑
i,x‖p∗i (aˆ|x)−pi(aˆ|x)‖. ψ̂1(Dˆ) is the minimum perturbation
needed for the empirical pmfs {pei (aˆ|x)} to satisfy the NIAS
and NIAC inequalities. Since {p∗i (aˆ|x)} are feasible pmfs, i.e.,
NIAS and NIAC hold, by the triangle inequality and (51) it
follows that
ψ̂1(Dˆ) ≤ ψ1(Dˆ) +
∑
i,x
‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖
Suppose the event {∑i,x‖pei (aˆ|x)− pi(aˆ|x)‖ ≤ d()} is true.
It implies from (52) that ψ̂1(Dˆ) ≤ ψ1(Dˆ) + d() and
P
(
ψ̂1(Dˆ)−ψ1(Dˆ) ≤ d()
)
≥ 1− g(, {Ni(x)}). (53)
If ψ̂1(Dˆ) ≤ ψ1(Dˆ) + d(), the Type-I error probability for
Test-1 (28) defined in (49) given ψ̂1(Dˆ) can be bounded as
P(Type-I error) = P(ψ̂1(Dˆ) ≥ Cα)
≤ P
(
ψ1(Dˆ) ≥ Cα − d()
)
≤ α+ h(),
where h() =
∫ d()
0
fL(β +Cα)dβ and the random variable L
is defined in (30).
Denote the Type-I error probability for Test-1 given {Ni(x)}
observations as γ1({Ni(x)}). Clearly, the event {ψ̂1(Dˆ) −
ψ1(Dˆ) ≤ d()} implies {γ1({Ni(x)}) ≤ α + h()} is true.
Therefore, from (53), the following holds
P (γ1({Ni(x)}) ≤ α+ h()) ≥ 1− g(, {Ni(x)})
which completes the proof.
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